In the last decades, many brand name OEMs, including IBM and Benz, have started embracing remanufacturing operations through collaborating with the independent third-party remanufacturers. Based on observations from current practice, we formulate two theoretical models for an OEM who produces new products itself but with two possible options for remanufacturing: 1) forgoing remanufacturing operations and all unmet demand of remanufactured products are satisfied by third-party remanufacturers or 2) entering into remanufacturing operations under a collaboration with the third-party remanufacturers. Our results reveal that the OEMs began to embrace remanufacturing mainly because they want to protect the new product and reduce the cannibalization effect by limiting the secondary market. In particular, we find that, compared with forgoing remanufacturing operations, collaboration with the third-party remanufacturers is always beneficial for the OEM but may be detrimental to the third-party remanufacturer and our environment. To limit the perverse incentives of the OEM, a revenue sharing contract, in which both parties can reach the Pareto gains, has been developed for both parties. We also find the non-collaboration will be more friendly to the environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although remanufacturing creates potential benefits for both profitability and environmental performance through reducing virgin raw material consumption and energy usage, many OEMs reluctantly undertake remanufacturing operations themselves [1] . For example, before the dot-com bubble of 1990s, IT OEMs mainly focused on their producing operations and discouraged consumers to purchase remanufactured products. The unmet demand provided an chance to remanufacture used IT equipment for third-party IT equipment remanufacturers [2] . According the report from Computer Business Review, in 2005, more than $100 million business in buying remanufactured PCs equipment are met by those third-party IT equipment remanufacturers. Similar case appears in auto parts market. For example, the Chentian auto parts market, one of the biggest auto parts
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Kezhi Wang. market in China, sells many remanufactured parts including Benz, BMW, AUDI etc., which are provided by third-party auto parts equipment remanufacturers. 1 Facing the numerous unauthorized remanufactured products, consumer always feel confused and naturally decrease the image of OEMs, such as Benz, BMW and AUDI. 2 To build-up of the brand image [3] and deal with the stress from environmental groups and governments [1] , [4] , [5] , more and more OEMs have started embracing remanufacturing operations, undertaking collecting used products and selling them to the third-party remanufacturers. For example, IBM collaborates third-party remanufacturers (3Ps) in remanufacturing through a certification program, where all 1 the interesting readers can get more details about Chentian Parts Market from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mDcnvdxbYpU and http:// www.sohu.com/a/687071_108226 2 For example, one consumer complain his sad experience of buy a remanufactured Benz parts, https://club.autohome.com.cn/bbs/thread/ cf62f3ad44210496/31840393-1.html used PCs are collected and meticulously tested by IBM engineer to ensure that the quality meet the certification program of remanufacturing. Similarly, Benz has set up three bases to collect used automotive parts for remanufacturing in Shanghai and began to produce in 2017. 3 A few studies have recently begun to highlight the collaborative behavior between OEMs and other agents on remanufactured products marketing. For example, Wang and Xiong [6] have studied one kind of the collaboration that the OEM plays the distributor role for the supplier who undertakes remanufacturing operations. However, based on the current observation, in this research we emphasize a quite common potential collaboration mode occurs in remanufacturing operations between the OEM and the thirdparty remanufacturer. More specifically, based on observations from motivated examples, we formulate two theoretical models for an OEM who produces new products itself, but with two possible options for remanufacturing: (1) forgoing remanufacturing operations and all unmet demand of remanufactured products are satisfied by the third-party remanufacturer or (2) entering into remanufacturing operations under a collaboration with the third-party remanufacturer with undertaking collecting used products.
Using these two models, we strive to address the following research questions.
1. Whether the OEM/remanufacturer should collaborate with each other in its remanufacturing operations? 2. How the collaboration in remanufacturing operations affect all parties' profitability? 3. How the collaboration in remanufacturing operations affect our environment? 4. As the Stackelberg leaders, can the OEM motivate the collaboration? Our study find collaboration with the third-party remanufacturers is always beneficial for the OEM. However, the remanufacturer's choice depends on the cost of remanufacturing. In particular, we find that the incentives for the OEM collaborating with remanufacturer is just to maximum its own profits, because such collaborating may be detrimental to remanufacturer and our environment, as well. To limit the perverse incentives for the OEM, a revenue sharing contract, in which both parties can reach the Pareto gains, has been developed for both parties.
Out work has two important contributions. The first is that, unlike highlighting the collaboration in marketing products between the OEM and its suppliers, we mainly focus on effect of the collaboration in used products collection with an independent third-party remanufacturer, which is not researched yet. The second is that, although numerous researches have addressed the competition between the OEM and the remanufacturers, unlike them, we pay our attention to a potential collaboration raises in remanufacturing operations, which is consistent with the fact of IBM and its third-party remanufacturers. 3 See http://www.cheyun.com/content/15096
The remainders of this research proceeds as follows. Section 2 addresses all related literature. Section 3 defines all parameters and outline our models and section 4 gets the models' solution. Section 5 provides a revenue contract for both parties to make the business sustainability. Section 6 will discuss the contributions, limitations and future research of this research.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
There are numerous researchers focus on the competition relationships between the remanufacturer and the OEM. For example, one study describes a model whose second period requires a OEM to choose whether or not to remanufacture [7] , while another one employs a model that examines an OEM recovery strategy in the face of competition [8] . The latter model is also expanded to characterize the optimal strategies in both mono-and duopolistic environments for single-period, two-period, multi-period and infinite-horizon settings, respectively [9] . Likewise, Oraiopoulos et al. [2] study how an OEM's incentives and optimal strategies vis-à-vis the secondary market are shaped contingent on her relative non-collaboration advantage, product characteristics, and consumer preferences. Recently, Huang et al. [10] explore the optimal strategies for a retailer-dominated closed-loop supply chain with a triple recycling channel in the construction machinery remanufacturing context. Meanwhile, Zhao et al. [11] consider a remanufacturing supply chain where a OEM adopts the dual collecting channels to recycle the used products. More recently, He et al. [12] , focusing on a closed-loop supply chain with competitive collection, investigate the recovery efficiency, as well as the customer behavior, under the inconvenience-perception in collection. Rather highlighting on the competition relationship between the OEM and the remanufacturers, we complement them by addressing the potential collaboration between the OEM and the remanufacturer.
The second stream of literature related this paper is collaboration behavior on products marketing. For example, Mclaren et al. [13] analyze the alternatives and presents a framework for understanding the expected costs and benefits of each type of system. Dangelico et al. [14] seek to enhance the understanding of the link between environmental management and firm performance, so contributing to the debate of being ''green and competitive''. Subsequently, Griffith et al. [15] show that customer participation as an information source positively influences new product advantage, but this effect is dampened when cross-national collaboration within a multinational is high. Ko et al. [16] then propose two strategies for a company's decision regarding the adjustment of market density and price by developing a pricing and collaborative model based on the delivery time of the last mile process. Li et al. [17] recently allocate the profits and determine the most stable allocation scheme for the urban joint distribution alliance as well as provide a direction for cooperation between express enterprises and lead managers to pay more attention to the comprehensive performance. VOLUME 7, 2019 As mentioned earlier, rather highlighting the collaboration in marketing new products between the OEM and its retailers, we mainly focus on effect of the collaboration in remanufacturing with an independent third-party remanufacturer, which is not researched yet.
This study is closed to Wang et al. [18] who extend the collaborative model in products marketing by characterizing it as a channel power structure under which the OEM plays the leader role in the collaboration. It should be noted that we differ from them in two important ways. First, they assume that all remanufacturing operations are undertaken by a supplier, a wholesaler for new products production, and they ignore a fact that there is almost 94 percent of remanufacturing operations are undertaken by the independent remanufacturers, but not the suppliers. Therefore, we assume the remanufacturing operations are undertaken by the independent remanufacturers. Second, they assume how the OEM should participate into the remarketing channels for remanufactured products impacts the operations management and profit performance of all parties. In contrast, we assume the OEM is always the Stackelberg leader and highlight whether the OEM should collaborate with those authorized third-party remanufacturers by outsourcing remanufacturing operations. This assumption is consistent with the fact that the OEMs, such as IBM and Benz, collaborate with third-party remanufacturers in remanufacturing through a certification program.
III. MODEL NOTATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
We investigate the non-collaborative (Model N) and collaborative model (Model C) in a single-period deterministic model. The main difference of two models is the remanufacturer will collect remanufactured products itself in Model N, while buy them from the OEM in Model C.
The symbols of parameters are listed in Table 1 . We state 3 assumptions for this study.
Assumption 1:
There is no quality distinction between a remanufactured and a new product, while producing a remanufactured product is less costly than manufacturing a new one, i.e. c r < c n .
This assumption means consumers distinguish the remanufactured from the new product, thus producers adopt the price discrimination policy [19] . Because the OEM uses its own network to collect the remanufactured product, it will afford less expense in collecting activity, we assume the collecting cost of the remanufactured product is zero [19] .
Assumption 2: All consumers' willingness-to-pay α ∈ (0, 1) is distributed uniformly in the interval [0,1] that means the market size is 1.
This assumption is widely accepted, such as Yan et al. [5] . A consumer of type α ∈ (0, 1) has a valuation of α for a new product and θ α for a remanufactured product, where θ denotes the consumer's tolerance for the remanufactured product to the new product [20] , [21] . The utility that each consumer derives from purchasing a product is given by the difference of their valuation and the price.
Assumption 3: The volume of new products (q n ) is larger than the volume of remanufactured products (q r ), i.e. (q n > q r > 0).
This assumption is to assure comparison of the interior point decisions to both models, which is accepted in Yan et al. [5] and Savaskan et al. [22] . We set c r1 = θ(2θ
, then we can get max (c r1 , c r2 ) < c r < θc n , which means remanufacturing is not adequately high or low from this assumption (See Appendix A).
We derive the demand functions from consumers' utility functions and assumption 1 and 2. This construction leads to the following linear demand functions:
The above functions capture the competition between remanufactured products and new products. Note that the relative willingness to pay (θ ) has a different effect on the sale volume of the new and the remanufactured products (for given price levels). As this parameter increases, the price of remanufactured products increases, that is, there is more competition between remanufactured products and new products. 
IV. MODEL FORMULATION AND SOLUTION A. NON-COLLABORATIVE MODEL (MODEL N)
We start our analysis in a single-period model that focuses on the non-collaboration between the OEM and the remanufacturer. In the Model N, the OEM sells new products, while the remanufacturer sells remanufactured products. Most importantly, the OEM does not supply the remanufactured products for the remanufacturer, and the remanufacturer collects the remanufactured product itself (Figure 1 ). The remanufactured products is sufficient throughout the product life cycle [23] .
Because the OEM and the remanufacturer do not collaborate with each other, then they make decision separately.
The OEM maximizes profits by solving
and the remanufactures maximizes profits by solving
We consider a two-echelon supply chain and model a bilateral monopoly between a single remanufacturer and a single OEM in Model C. The OEM has sufficient channel power over the remanufacturer to act as a Stackelberg leader [24] . In Model C (Figure 2 ), consider the model with unconstrained remanufactured products supply throughout the product life cycle [23] . With these elements, the OEM's single-period objective function can be written as
and the remanufacturer's single-period objective function can be written as
Based on the Stackelberg game, Model C is solved by backward induction. In the Model C, the OEM, firstly, determines the optimal price w * and p * n in anticipating how the remanufacturer will respond once it has observed the decisions of the OEM. Secondly, remanufacturer, as a follower, actually observes this and picks the optimal wholesale price as a response.
The optimal decisions and profits of both models are shown in Table 2 , and the proof can be seen in Appendixes B and C.
C. ANALYSIS
We are now able to answer the questions proposed at the beginning of this research, whether the collaborative remanufacturing will exist and how collaboration affect the whole supply chain. We compare the equilibrium decisions of both the OEM and the remanufacturer in both models based on the equilibrium outcomes in Table 2 .
Proposition 1: The optimal price of the new product in the Model C is higher than it is in the Model N, i.e. and the remanufactured products will be cheaper. The second reason is about the cannibalization effect. The cheaper remanufactured products will compete the new product in Model N, lowering the new product's price in Model N. However, the remanufactured product's price in Model C, due to the payment of remanufactured products for the OEM, is higher than its in Model N. So, it is natural to have the proposition 1.
Proposition 2: The optimal profit of the OEM in the Model C is higher than that in the Model N, i.e.
Surprisingly, this proposition means the OEM should choose the Model C from its own profit standpoint. We know OEMs ignored remanufacturing for many years, but they can get more profit in Model C. VOLUME 7, 2019 Actually, in the Model C, the OEM is the leader, and the remanufacturer is 'controlled' because the OEM handles the sale channels of the remanufactured products. So, the OEM can make a pricing decision which is advantageous to its profit. Whereas in the Model N, the remanufacturer is independent of the OEM and can (A)make a better pricing strategy for remanufactured products, (B) cannibalize more market from the OEM. So, the manufacture's profit in Model C is higher than in Model N.
Proposition 3: The remanufacturer will accept Model N i.e. π C * R < π N * R when the remanufacturing cost max(c r1
); otherwise it would prefer to Model C, i.e. π C * R > π N * R , (See Appendix F). The proposition 3 gives us insight to understand the remanufacturer's choice. From proposition 2, the OEM can obtain more profits from the remanufacturer through handling the wholesale price of the remanufactured product. So, why the remanufacturer need to collaborate with the OEM? It is mainly because of remanufacturing cost. If the remanufacturing cost is high, which always means the remanufacturer must depend on OEM to finish remanufacturing, then the Model C is a better choice even it must pay for the remanufactured products. However, if the remanufacturing cost is relatively low, which usually insinuates the remanufacturer can complete remanufacturing independently, thus the remanufacturer will choose Model N.
Proposition 4: The Model N is more friendly to environment than Model C (See Appendix G).
This proposition is somehow counterintuitive but rational. It is counterintuitive because consumer and government call on OEMs to remanufacture in order to reduce the environmental burden. However, the environment strain will be worse in Model C from proposition 4.
In Model C, the OEM is the leader of remanufacturing, and the remanufacturer follows the OME's decision. For OEM, it will consider both remanufactured products and new products, so the supply of remanufactured products will be restricted due to the worry of cannibalization effect. In Model N, the remanufacturer can make decision independently, so it will supply more remanufactured products because of low remanufacturing cost, which has less disposal impact to environment.
Remark 1: The Model C is worse to environment and may be harmful to remanufacturer.
When carrying out remanufacturing, the OEM can get high new products' price (proposition 1) and more profit by selling remanufactured products (proposition 2). However, in Model C, the remanufacturer's profit may be curtailed if c r is low (proposition 3) and the environment sustainability will be worse (proposition 4). Generally speaking, the Model C is more beneficial to OEM but worse to environment and the remanufacturer in some situation.
These 4 propositions imply OEMs will somehow restrict the remanufacturing by high remanufactured price, and the restriction is feasible because of its leadership in supply chain. In Model N, the remanufacturer can get rid of this limit and supply more remanufactured products, which are more favorable to environment. Then, why the OEM embraces remanufacturing? Actually, the OEMs began to embrace remanufacturing mainly because they want to protect the new product and reduce the cannibalization effect by limiting secondary market [2] . For example, Sun company wanted to eradicate remanufacturing by 'collaboration'. Marion (2004) stated the fact that Sun company set a high relicensing fee and remanufacturing cost is almost equal to a new product. 'A customer, lessor or financial institution with an interest in a used E6500 will lose all or substantially all of the residual value it was anticipating in this machine as a result of this pricing scheme'. Marion (2004) highlighted 'Sun is deliberately attempting to eliminate the secondary market for its machines worldwide' [25] .
So, can we prohibit OEM from remanufacturing? The remanufacturing market without OEM will (A) not exist when remanufacturing is absolutely difficult (e.g. c r is high) and (B) harm OEM brand image. This market always confuses consumer and will finally injures consumer surplus as it is shown in introduction. It is more thoughtful to ameliorate Model C so as to protect the remanufacturer's profit and environment.
V. THE IMPROVEMENT OF REMANUFACTURING IN MODEL C
From the proposition 2, the OEM always chooses Model C because of (A) more profit and (B) the enhancement of environment and policy pressure. However, the remanufacturer's choice depend on the c r from the proposition 3. So, what is a better choice from both the OEM and the remanufacturer perspective?
Proposition 5: The total profit in Model C is higher than that in Model NC, i.e. π C * T > π NC * T (See Appendix H ). From proposition 2, we know that the OEM accepts the Model C. From proposition 3, we know that if the remanufacturing cost is higher, the remanufacturer accepts the Model C; if the manufacturing cost is lower, the remanufacturer accepts the Model NC. The proposition 5 demonstrates that Model C is a better decision from whole supply chain. As a matter of fact, when they collaborate with each other, OEM can share much information with remanufacturer such as technology, product knowledge and production skill. Moreover, the remanufacturer can get convenient help from the OEM when facing difficulties. Both the sharing information and appropriate help can improve the efficiency of remanufacturing, which will benefit both partners.
Proposition 6: If the total profit of the Model C is more than it of the Model N, they will collaborate with each other even if the remanufacturer is not willingness to choose it in consideration of its own profit.
Since the OEM would like to choose Model C (proposition 2), can it promote the Model C when the remanufacturer prefers Model N? The proposition 5 states the total profit of the Model C is more than that of the Model N, i.e.,
It implies that the extra profit earned by the OEM in the Model C is more than the extra profit earned by the remanufacturer in the Model N, i.e.,
So, if the OEM transfers part of its profit to the remanufacturer and the transferring ensures the remanufacturer can earn more in the Model C, they will both get more profit in model C.
But, what will the OEM do when the remanufacturer does not choose Model C even having more profit after profit transferring? The OEM can eliminate the remanufacturing by law in order to protect new products and brand image. So, the remanufacturer will accept Model C if the OEM transfers enough profit. Thus, we need to find the transferring ratio that will get the remanufacturer choose Model C.
Proposition 7: If the OEM and the remanufacturer both choose model C, the transferring ratio of the OEM ρ 1 ∈ (ϕ 1 , 1) only if
From proposition 6, the remanufacturer will accept collaboration only if its profit in the Model C is more than that in the Model N. Therefore, the loss generated if the remanufacturer chooses the Model C must be offset by the OEM's transferring. Meanwhile, the OEM has to guarantee its own profit in the Model C after transferring part of its profit to the remanufacturer.
The proposition 7 shows the transferring ration primarily depend on the θ and c r . It is logical because the remanufacturer's choice is up to c r (proposition 3) and the θ demonstrates the replacement between new products and remanufactured products which certainly affects the remanufacturer's profit and choice.
From proposition 7, we can also know the collaboration will hardly exist if (A) θ is small and c r is high or (B) θ is large and c r is low. Supposing that θ is small and c r is high, consumer is willing to buy new products and the price of remanufactured products is high, making remanufacturing hard to get profit in both Model C and Model N. Then, the remanufacturing may not exist. In case that θ is large and c r is low, consumer is more willing to buy remanufactured products and the price of remanufactured products is low, which has remanufacturer get profit easily. The remanufacturer would like to choose Model N because of low c r (proposition 3). Making the remanufacturer choose the Model C, the OEM will transfer too much profit and its own profit in Model C will be smaller than that in Model N.
Remark 2: Although Model C is better for whole supply chain, the spontaneous remanufacturing from then OEM is harmful to environment and sometimes harmful to the remanufacturer even we envision OEM-led remanufacturing has more environmental sustainability. So, more deliberate remanufacturing policy need be carried out.
Many countries and organizations have been executing environmental laws, original from extended product responsibility (EPR), such as Packaging Ordinance (Germany, 1991), Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment (EU, 2002) and Management Measures for Recycling of Renewable Resources (China, 2003). These rules mainly urge the OEMs to take responsibility of their products. However, without good policy, the consequence may be counterproductive. Conforming to proposition 5, 6 and 7, we need to impulse the OEM to get involved in the remanufacturing but not control this mission. In the U.S.A, 23 states have performed similar laws by the end of 2015. Some states such as Illinois and Rhode, demand the OEM only offer funding and the third-party company manage the other remanufacturing process [26] , which is more judicious.
VI. CONCLUSION
The non-collaborative remanufacturing has existed in product marketing for a long time. However, as the remanufacturing industry develops, the collaboration has become prevailed gradually. What's more is the environmental and policy stress expedite the manufacturer to face remanufacturing.
Out work has two important contributions. The first is that, unlike highlighting the collaboration in marketing products between the OEM and its suppliers, we mainly focus on effect of the collaboration in remanufacturing with an independent third-party remanufacturer, which is consistent with the fact that, in U.S. remanufacturing industry, almost 94% of more than two thousand remanufacturing firms are the independent third-party remanufacturer. The second is that, although numerous researches have addressed the competition between the OEM and the remanufacturers, unlike them, we pay our attention to a potential collaboration raises in remanufacturing operations, which is consistent with the fact of IBM and its third-party remanufacturers.
The outcome of this paper is interesting because we find that the OEM and the whole supply chain are willing to choose the Model C, while the remanufacturer's choice is up to the cost of making a remanufactured product (c r ). However, once the total profit in the collaboration is higher than the competition, the remanufacturer would choose the Model C because the OEM could transfer part of its profit to the remanufacturer for ensuring the earning of the remanufacturer in the collaboration.
Our result is also helpful to policy because we find the Model N (NOT Model C) is more friendly to environment. We have been listening the increasing voice for many years that wants the OEM to take more responsibility by participating remanufacturing, however, the Model N is better to environment and the remanufacturer in some context.
We have several assumptions that can be relaxed in future research to develop a more general understanding of the collaborative remanufacturing. First, this research builds on a single period. However, in some cases, the production and sale of the remanufactured product is not just limited to a single period, and more behaviors of the players take place in the two, multi-period dynamic competition model. Therefore, the next step is to study the model in a two, multi-cycle even infinite cycle. Second, this research normalizes the collecting cost of the remanufactured product to be zero. However, the collecting cost, in some situations, is an important factor VOLUME 7, 2019 in managing the remanufactured product. We may get more insights about the Model C if considering the collecting cost in model. Third, we assume the OEM plays the Stackelberg leader role in the Model C. However, it is not certainly like this in practice, sometimes the remanufacturer can play the leader role. Therefore, the next step we can characterize the Model C when the remanufacturer is the leader.
APPENDIX A
We get
< c r < θ c n by solving q C * n > q C * r > 0, and
and c r2 =
, we can get c r2 < c r1 if 0 < θ < 593/2705, and c r1 < c r2 if 593/2705 < θ < 1.
APPENDIX B
Based on the Stackelberg game, the manufacturer, as a leader, firstly determines the optimal price w * and p * n in anticipating how the remanufacturer will respond once it has observed the decisions of the OEM. The remanufacturer, as a follower, actually observes this and picks the optimal wholesale price as a response. The model is solved by backward induction.
In the first stage, for the given prices of the OEM, the remanufacturer solves the following problem:
. The first derivative
and solving it yields that
. Substituting p N * r into demand functions yields that q C * n (w, p n ) = 
. Then we can get
. Jointly solving these two equations yield p C * n = (1 + c n )/2 and w * = (θ − c r )/2.
APPENDIX C
Based on the Stackelberg game, the OEM, as a leader, first determines the optimal price p n in anticipating how the remanufacturer will respond once it has observed the decisions of the OEM. The remanufacturer, as a follower, actually observes this and picks the optimal wholesale price as a response. The model is solved by backward induction. In the first stage, for the given prices of the OEM, the remanufacturer solves the following problem: 
. It's partial derivative to p n is 2−θ ) ). Because of c r < θc n , c n < 1, so c r < θ. Thus, we get p C * n > p N * n .
APPENDIX E
We get this proposition from π C * M − π N * M = ((θ − c r ) 2 )/ (θ (2 − θ )), and it is obviously positive because 0 < θ < 1, i.e. π C * M > π N * M .
APPENDIX F
We can obtain that the optimal profit of the remanufacturer in the Model C is . Comparing the former with the latter, we get that
. Setting c r3 = (θ (θc n − 2c n + θ − 1))/(2θ − 3), we observe that if max(c r1 , c r2 ) < c r < c r3 ,π C * R < π N * R ; while c r3 < c r < θc n , π C * R > π N * R .
APPENDIX G
We only analyze the disposal impact of per-unit product, and define it as e n = i n (q n − q r ) because the clearance impact can be removed by remanufacturing. Similarly, the clearance impact of a remanufactured product is e r = i r q r . Then, the disposal impact in Model C and Model N are E C = i n (q C * n − q C * r ) + i u q C * r = i n q C * n + (i n − i u )q C * r and E N = i n (q N * n − q N * r ) + i u q N * r = i n q N * n + (i n − i u )q N * r respectively. We can get E C − E N = 1 2(θ −c r )(θ−2)θ . The c r is smaller than θ because c r < θc n and θ is within [0, 1] . So, it is easily to know E C − E N is always negative.
APPENDIX H
The optimal total profit in the Model C is π C * T = π C * M + π C * R ; the optimal total profit in the Model N is π N * T = π N * M + π N * R . Substituting the optimal solutions to these equations, we can get − (4c r − 2θ − 2θc n − 3θ c r + θ 2 c n + 2θ 2 2 /(16θ(θ − 1)(θ − 2)
2 ) Comparing the former with the latter, we have π C * T − π N * T = (θ −c r )(c r +θ −2θ c n −θc r +θ 2 c n ) 4θ (2−θ) 2 . We can get π C * T − π N * T > 0 in max(c r1 , c r2 ) < c r < θc n .
APPENDIX I
That is π N * R < π C * R + ρ 1 π C * M − π N * M . Solving this equation after substituting the equilibrium outcomes of the profits into this equation, we find that only when the paying ratio is no smaller than φ 1 = 2θ c r −3c r −c n θ 2 −θ 2 +2θc n +θ (θ−c r ) (2−θ) , the profits of the manufacturer and the remanufacturer in the Model C are higher than these in the Model N, respectively. 
